

solarwinds  |  Prosperon networks

SOLARWINDS SECURITY INCIDENT REVIEW & WHAT TO DO NEXT TO PROTECT YOUR PLATFORM

Thursday 7th January 2020





Prosperon Networks

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- Introduction to Webinar & Prosperon Network Overview
- Sunburst and Supernova Security Vulnerabilities
- Current situation
- Actions to perform and decide upon
- Question & Answer Session
- Resources Available


PROSPERON AT GLANCE



Partner for 15 Years



First UK Partner



Over 800 Days PS



800 Support Cases pa



8 SCP Engineers



Security Cleared




Technical Excellence Award



THWACK MVP



Consultancy



Implementation



System Integration



Training



Support



Health Checks

POLL: 1

**HAVE YOU UPGRADED YOUR ORION
PLATFORM YET?**

- FireEye a CyberSecurity company announced on 13th Dec 2020 they had identified a vulnerability in their installation of SolarWinds Orion
- A ‘Supply Chain’ vulnerability existed whereby signed files had malicious code within them, which could be used to allow malicious actor to execute commands on affected systems
- SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is the file affected and had code added that makes an HTTP call home, masquerading its traffic as part of the Orion Improvement Program protocol
- A very clever design
 - Hiding itself within genuine application protocols
 - Authentic digitally signed files
 - System checks to determine if it is ‘safe’ to make the call home
 - Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) hash which includes source domain data
- No indication of automated malicious activity, but a call to Command & Control (C2) domain (<DGA>.appsync-api.<region>.avscmcloud.com)
 - Microsoft took swift ownership of this domain, which enabled identification of compromised organisations



- An additional vulnerability was detected as part of the investigations into Sunburst
- Currently not felt to be connected to the Sunburst vulnerability and therefore from a second threat source
- This malware is an unsigned file 'App_Web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll', which is placed in the IIS "Inetpub\SolarWinds\bin folder" providing a method of remote code execution as a 'webshell' method, a known common attack vector
- This file is NOT implanted as part of the SolarWinds Orion application, instead would have to come from another source yet to be determined
- Designed to hide itself within legitimate Orion code, replacing original file with file which includes the malicious backdoor code, exposing a web API to receive commands from Command & Control source
- Designed to run fully in memory to reduce any fingerprint or forensic tracing

AFFECTED ORION VERSIONS

Orion Platform Version	Known Affected by SUNBURST?	Known Vulnerable to SUPERNOVA?	Recommended Action
2020.2.1 HF 2	NO	NO	No action needed
2020.2.1 & 2020.2.1 HF 1	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2
2020.2 & 2020.2 HF1	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2
2019.4 HF 6	NO	NO	No action needed
2019.4 HF 5	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2019.4 HF 6 (or upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2)
2019.4 HF 4 2019.4 HF 3 2019.4 HF 2 2019.4 HF 1 2019.4	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2019.4 HF 6 (or upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2)
2019.2 HF 3	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2 (or apply 2019.2 HF 3 Security Patch)
2019.2 HF 2 2019.2 HF 1 2019.2	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2 (or upgrade to 2019.2 HF 3 AND apply 2019.2 HF 3 Security Patch)
2018.4 2018.2	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF2 (or ensure you are running 2018.4 HF3 AND apply the 2018.4 HF3 Security Patch)
All prior versions	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.1 HF 2, apply temporary mitigation script, or discontinue use

SOLARWINDS – APPLICATIONS **NOT** AFFECTED

8Man	Engineer's Toolset	Papertrail	SQL Sentry
Access Rights Manager (ARM)	Engineer's Web Toolset	Patch Manager	DB Sentry
AppOptics	FailOver Engine	Pingdom	V Sentry
Backup Document	Firewall Security Monitor	Pingdom Server Monitor	Win Sentry
Backup Profiler	Identity Monitor	Security Event Manager (SEM)	BI Sentry
Backup Server	ipMonitor	Security Event Manager Workstation Edition	SentryOne Document
Backup Workstation	Kiwi CatTools	Server Profiler	SentryOne Test
CatTools	Kiwi Log Viewer	Service Desk	Task Factory
Dameware Mini Remote Control	Kiwi Syslog Server	Serv-U FTP Server	DBA xPress
Dameware Patch Manager	LANSurveyor	Serv-U Gateway	Plan Explorer
Dameware Remote Everywhere	Librato	Serv-U MFT Server	APS Sentry
Dameware Remote Manager	Log & Event Manager (LEM)	Storage Manager	DW Sentry
Database Performance Analyzer (DPA)	Log and Event Manager Workstation Edition	Storage Profiler	SQL Sentry Essentials
Database Performance Monitor (DPM)	Loggly	Threat Monitor	SentryOne Monitor
DNSstuff	Mobile Admin	Virtualization Profiler	BI xPress
	Network Topology Mapper (NTM)	Web Help Desk	

- Check the hash (SHA256 of the files to identify if you have any malicious versions of the file SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
 - From 2019.4 HF 5:
`32519b85c0b422e4656de6e6c41878e95fd95026267daab4215ee59c107d6c77`
 - From 2020.2:
`ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6`
 - `019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134`
 - `ac1b2b89e60707a20e9eb1ca480bc3410ead40643b386d624c5d21b47c02917c`
 - `c09040d35630d75dfef0f804f320f8b3d16a481071076918e9b236a321c1ea77`
 - `dab758bf98d9b36fa057a66cd0284737abf89857b73ca89280267ee7caf62f3b`
 - `eb6fab5a2964c5817fb239a7a5079cabca0a00464fb3e07155f28b0a57a2c0ed`
- SolarWinds have a script to automate this process
 - <https://tinyurl.com/yyp3r552>
- Review traffic logs to known IOC domains
 - deftsecurity[.]com
 - avsvmcloud[.]com
 - digitalcollege[.]org
 - freescanonline[.]com
 - globalnetworkissues[.]com
 - kubeccloud[.]com
 - lcomputers[.]com
 - seobundlekit[.]com
 - solartrackingsystem[.]net
 - thedoccloud[.]com
 - virtualwebdata[.]com
 - webcodez[.]com
 - 13.59.205.66
 - 18.217.225.111
 - 18.220.219.143
 - 196.203.11.89
 - 3.16.81.254
 - 3.87.182.149
 - 3.87.182.149
 - 34.219.234.134
 - 54.193.127.66
 - 54.215.192.52

- Check the hash (SHA256) of the app_web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll file
 - **C15abaf51e78ca56c0376522d699c978217bf041a3bd3c71d09193efa5717c71**

Administrator: Windows PowerShell

```
PS C:\inetpub\SolarWinds\bin> Get-FileHash app_web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll -Algorithm SHA256 | Format-List
```

```
Algorithm : SHA256  
Hash      : 00580262B4EFBB603576B2D3EED12B067FDDCF60A93F37250DFBEF33A80EB615  
Path      : C:\inetpub\SolarWinds\bin\app_web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll
```

- SolarWinds SUPERNOVA validation script
 - PowerShell script to confirm that you do not have vulnerable files
 - https://support.solarwinds.com/SuccessCenter/s/article/Use-a-script-to-verify-that-the-Supernova-patch-was-applied-to-all-Orion-web-servers?language=en_US

- Identify if you are running an affected version
- Review your infrastructure for the IoC's
 - Review network Traffic logs, proxy logs, web traffic logs for communication to any of the C2 domains
 - Review lateral movement: new account logins to key infrastructure, privilege account escalation, new high-level accounts created
- Plan your immediate Orion patch/upgrade response
- Plan your long term Orion patch/upgrade response
- Change the password on all Service Accounts Orion uses to monitor and manage your infrastructure
 - NPM/SAM/IPAM credentials
 - NCM SSH/Telnet credentials
 - VMan credentials

Patch

- If your version has a patch available, this is quickest security fix method.
- Instructions provided in patch Zip file on replacing files, settings etc.
- Each server must have the correct patching applied

Upgrade

- An application upgrade will deal with vulnerability resolution and provide enhancements, new features, performance benefits
- Depending on version level and modules and scale, it can take as little as 30 minutes to perform the actual upgrade
- If on version 11.x (2016.1) or below a multi step upgrade is necessary and likely recommendation to migrate to new servers for OS upgrade etc.
- Opportunity to review architecture; topology, use of cloud for hosting platform

NO COMPROMISE EXPOSURE

- Review version upgrade path
 - Orion Web Console (2019.x +) Settings > My Deployment > Upgrades
 - Support Portal > Upgrade Advisor
- Capture essential information
 - Server details; Name, IP, Local Admin login
 - SQL Server; location and account details - default username is SolarWindsOrionDatabaseUser
- Backups!
 - VM Snapshot (or whatever quick restore method you have)
 - SQL Database backups (Orion, Netflow, Log)
- Upgrade method – Centralised through Orion Web UI or Offline
 - Allow Internet access to specific URL's for centralised upgrade to download necessary files

RISK AVERSE

- Removes risk of compromise being placed on the server for later usage
- Essentially the same as previous option, but fresh Application servers provided
- Keep the SQL database, within the Configuration Wizard process connect to the existing Orion database(s)
- ALL configuration and historic data remains
- Installation performed on the servers directly
 - Primary first then Additional Polling Engines and Additional Web Servers
- Use same Hostname or IP Address
 - Changes in DB necessary if you change the Hostnames of any Orion role servers
- Still very quick to implement
 - Example 5 Application server topology can be installed in a single day

TOTAL RISK AVERSE

- Slash and Burn approach with new servers and a blank Orion configuration and loss of all historic data
- Can be mitigated by reviewing the database, so an option felt can be avoided
 - Tools that were monitoring for any schema changes
 - Manual review of areas of the DB that could be used to re-execute malicious code; Alerting Engine, Stored Procedures, SAM script based monitors, NCM scripts
- Configuration can be exported from old platform, to expedite rebuild and bring same definition back
 - Alerts, Reports, SAM templates, UnDP templates, Views (via a script), Groups & dependencies (via a script)
 - However, this negates the reason for starting afresh

How does this incident change how you do things within Orion and ANY solution which has privileges to perform administrator level tasks

- Whitelisted access to the Internet from any Orion role server
 - <https://thwack.solarwinds.com/t5/NPM-Documents/Orion-URLs-for-Firewall-Whitelisting/tac-p/614090>
 - Create within your new monitoring procedure change request for adding to whitelist e.g. onboarding new SAS solution to allow monitoring of that platform
- Least Minimum Privileges
 - Reduce to lowest level possible, whilst maintaining function permissions Orion user accounts have for collecting data
 - Windows WMI protocol Read Only account vs Domain Administrator – can be painful to configure but is perfectly feasible
- Does the use of the SolarWinds Orion agent for polling increase your security position?

- Enable end-point protection on Orion servers, removing previous guidance on file/folder exclusions
 - Except MDF/LDF SQL files
 - Closely monitor performance impact of removal of such exclusions
 - **NOTE:** Some AV solutions are incorrectly identifying the updated safe files
 - SolarWinds are expected to update their advice in this area
- Central and capable event log monitoring - Are you capturing all of the data you need for forensic analysis?
 - Windows Event Logs, including AD audit events
 - Authentication system logs; AD, Radius, TACACS
 - Application logs
 - Network device logs (Syslog/SNMP Traps)
- Is your forensic source data being kept long enough to go back to point in time such a vulnerability was deployed

POLL: 2

**Will YOU BE REVIEWING HOW YOU
MONITOR YOUR INFRASTRUCTURE DUE
TO THIS SECURITY INCIDENT?**

DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

**PLEASE POST IN THE GOTOWEBINAR
ASK A QUESTION PANEL**

- Core SolarWinds Security Advisory
 - <https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory>
- Prosperon Blog Posts on incident
 - <https://prosperon.co.uk/insights/applying-solarwinds-orion-remediation-to-vulnerability/>
 - <https://prosperon.co.uk/insights/solarwinds-security-alert/>
- FireEye Blog Post
 - <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html>
- SolarWinds Upgrade Guides
 - https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/Success_Center/orionplatform/content/orion_platform_installation_guide.htm
 - https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/Success_Center/orionplatform/content/orion_platform_migration_guide.htm
- Collated list of links on this incident
 - <https://github.com/eanmeyer/SolarwindsVulnerabilityInfo>